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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 16-2473 
______________ 
 
LORI MOECK, In her capacity as 
parent and natural guarding of C.M. 
and A.M.; C.M. a minor; A.M., a minor 
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PLEASANT VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT; 
DOUGLAS C. ARNOLD, Superintendent of Schools,  
Pleasant Valley School District; ANTHONY A. FADULE, 
Assistant Superintendent of Schools, Pleasant Valley School 
District; JOHN J. GRESS, Principal, Pleasant Valley School 
District: MARK GETZ, Wrestling Coach, Pleasant Valley 
School District 
 
Pleasant Valley School District, 
    Appellant 
   
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 3:13-cv-01305) 
District Judge: Hon. James L. Munley 
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______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
December 20, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE and SHWARTZ, 
Circuit Judges.  
 
(Filed: December 23, 2016) 
 
 
Michael I. Levin, Esq. 
Paul J. Cianci, Esq. 
Levin Legal Group, P.C. 
1301 Masons Mill Business Park 
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Huntingdon Valley, PA 19006 
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Michael C. Schwartz, Esq. 
Jonathan J. James, Esq. 
James, Schwartz & Associates, P.C. 
1500 Walnut Street 
21st Floor 
Philadelphia, PA 19102 
 
  Counsel for Appellees 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
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______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Pleasant Valley School District (the “School District”) 
appeals the District Court’s order denying its motions for 
sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 against Plaintiffs and 
their counsel.  Because the District Court appropriately 
exercised its wide discretion in concluding the motions lacked 
merit, and were counterproductive as they relied upon factual 
discrepancies that did not show the claims were patently 
frivolous, we will affirm. 
 
I 
 
 This case arises out of incidents between two members 
of the Pleasant Valley High School (the “High School”) 
wrestling team, C.M. and his sister A.M., and the team’s 
coach, Mark Getz.  Getz allegedly assaulted C.M. and 
discriminated against A.M. based on her gender.  Plaintiffs 
alleged that during a team practice, C.M. was forced to 
wrestle a larger student, who threw him through the 
gymnasium doors into the hallway and punched him, and 
after Getz prodded C.M. to keep wrestling, a verbal and 
physical altercation ensued between Getz and C.M. in which 
Getz lifted C.M. up and “smash[ed] his head and back into 
the wall.”  App. 31, 54.  Plaintiffs also asserted, among other 
things, that A.M. suffered gender discrimination through a 
culture of misogyny and intimidation, which allegedly 
included numerous sexually charged comments by Getz and 
the assistant coaches.   
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 C.M., A.M., and their mother Lori Moeck 
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) brought various federal and state 
law claims against the School District, its Superintendent, its 
Assistant Superintendent, the High School’s Principal (the 
“School Defendants”), and Getz (collectively, “Defendants”), 
seeking compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive 
relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs.  Following discovery, the 
School Defendants and Getz filed separate motions for 
summary judgment.  Each motion was supported by a brief 
and statement of undisputed material facts (“Rule 56.1 
statement”).   
 Defendants thereafter filed two motions for sanctions.  
In one motion, the School Defendants asserted that discovery 
showed that Plaintiffs made numerous false statements in the 
complaint and amended complaint, and their claims lacked 
merit.  In the second motion, Defendants asserted that 
Plaintiffs’ Rule 56.1 statement contained false statements.  
Many of the examples Defendants cited in both motions 
focused on small details that have little bearing on the essence 
of Plaintiffs’ claims—that Getz allegedly acted in an 
aggressive and discriminatory manner.  For instance, 
Plaintiffs alleged that Getz “grabb[ed] [C.M.] by the neck and 
chok[ed]” him, App. 39, 62, while C.M.’s testimony 
disclosed that Getz grabbed him by the shirt, under his neck.  
Similarly, Defendants complained that Plaintiffs alleged that 
Getz “lifted [C.M.] onto his toes, and ran with him . . . 
causing him to smash his head and back into the wall,” App. 
31, 54, while testimony showed that Getz “speed walk[ed],” 
App. 113, and “put [C.M.] up on the wall,” App. 182, and that 
C.M.’s head “wasn’t extremely pounded,” App. 200; see also 
App. 1103 (comparing the representation in the brief that 
C.M.’s “toes were off the ground” when Getz lifted him up 
with C.M.’s testimony that he “was on [his] tippy-toes up 
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against the wall,” App. 198).1  Plaintiffs filed motions to stay 
Defendants’ Rule 11 motions until the District Court ruled on 
the pending summary judgment motions.   
 
 Before ruling on the summary judgment motions, the 
District Court denied Defendants’ Rule 11 motions.  The 
court found “the motions meritless,” noting that these Rule 11 
motions tax judicial resources and emphasizing that the truth 
of the allegations in a case of this sort is revealed through 
discovery and addressed at summary judgment or trial, not 
via motions for sanctions.  App. 3.  The School District 
appeals.2 
 
II3 
 
 We review a district court’s order on a Rule 11 motion 
for abuse of discretion.  Simmerman v. Corino, 27 F.3d 58, 
                                                                
1 Defendants also asserted Plaintiffs’ counsel falsified 
a document by changing the format of an e-mail from a parent 
of a former member of the wrestling team into a document 
that looked like a letter, and then sent it along with a cover 
letter to its author, soliciting information about Getz and 
misconduct at the School District.  The record does not show 
that Plaintiffs submitted the letter or e-mail to the District 
Court.   
2 Plaintiffs do not appeal the orders granting 
Defendants’ motions for summary judgment and declining to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law assault 
and battery claim.   
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.   
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61 (3d Cir. 1994).  Thus, “‘we evaluate the court’s factual 
determinations, legal conclusions, and choice of an 
‘appropriate sanction’ with substantial deference, considering 
not whether we would make the same precise determinations, 
but only whether those determinations are contrary to reason 
or without a reasonable basis in law and fact.’”  Ario v. 
Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for the 
1998 Year of Account, 618 F.3d 277, 287 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Simmerman, 27 F.3d at 62). 
 
A 
 
 We first review the School District’s assertion that 
Plaintiffs failed to oppose the first motion for sanctions and 
that the District Court erred in declining to grant the 
supposedly unopposed motion.  The School District contends 
that, pursuant to Middle District Local Rule 7.6, the District 
Court should have treated the School Defendants’ first Rule 
11 motion as unopposed and thus granted the Rule 11 motion.  
Local Rule 7.6 provides that any party opposing any motion 
other than a motion for summary judgment shall file a 
response within 14 days of service of the movant’s brief and 
“[a]ny party who fails to comply with this rule shall be 
deemed not to oppose such motion.”  M.D. Pa. Local R. 7.6.  
Our Court has noted that “[t]here may be some cases where 
the failure of a party to oppose a motion will indicate that the 
motion is in fact not opposed, particularly if the party is 
represented by an attorney and in that situation the [local] rule 
may be appropriately invoked.”  Stackhouse v. 
Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1992); see also 
DiPaolo v. Moran, 407 F.3d 140, 144-45 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(affirming grant of unopposed Rule 11 motion where no 
7 
responsive pleading was filed and “the sanctions motion here 
did not involve obvious facial deficiencies”).4   
 
 Here, the District Court correctly treated the School 
Defendants’ motion as opposed.  Although Plaintiffs did not 
specifically file a brief in opposition to that Rule 11 motion, 
Plaintiffs did respond by filing a motion to stay.  In that 
motion, Plaintiffs argued that “[b]ecause much of the issues 
raised in . . . Defendants [sic] Rule 11 motions go to the 
evidence ultimately before this Court, Plaintiff [sic] is seeking 
to place the Rule 11 motion and any proposed filing of a Rule 
11 motion in suspense until after the summary judgment 
motions are decided.”  App. 662.5  Plaintiffs in essence 
asserted that the fact-sensitive issues raised in the School 
Defendants’ sanctions motion would best be evaluated at the 
summary judgment stage and accordingly opposed 
consideration of the Rule 11 motion on that basis.  Cf. 
Anchorage Assocs. v. V.I. Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 
174 (3d Cir. 1990) (explaining that the local rule at issue 
“authorizes the court to grant applications solely on the basis 
of the information that the moving party puts before the court 
unless there is some response indicating that a genuine 
                                                                
4 The rule may also be invoked “if a party fails to 
comply with the rule after a specific direction to comply from 
the court.”  Stackhouse, 951 F.2d at 30.  The record does not 
indicate that the District Court instructed Plaintiffs to file a 
response to the School Defendants’ motion.   
5 A district court has the authority to “defer its ruling” 
on a Rule 11 motion until “final resolution of the case.”  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 11, Advisory Committee’s Note to 1993 
Amendment.  Thus, it is hard to say a party asking a court to 
defer such a ruling is not responding to the sanctions motion. 
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controversy exists concerning the right to the relief sought”).  
Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
declining to treat the motion as unopposed.   
 
B 
 
 The District Court also did not abuse its discretion in 
denying both Rule 11 motions.6  Despite the School District’s 
                                                                
6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) provides: 
 
By presenting to the court a pleading, written 
motion, or other paper—whether by signing, 
filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an 
attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to 
the best of the person’s knowledge, information, 
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable 
under the circumstances: 
. . .  
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal 
contentions are warranted by existing law or by 
a nonfrivolous argument for extending, 
modifying, or reversing existing law or for 
establishing new law; 
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary 
support or, if specifically so identified, will 
likely have evidentiary support after a 
reasonable opportunity for further investigation 
or discovery . . . . 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2)-(3).  If a court determines that Rule 
11(b) has been violated after notice and an opportunity to 
respond, it “may impose an appropriate sanction on any 
9 
argument that the District Court abused its discretion by 
denying the Rule 11 motions without analyzing their merits, 
the District Court specifically stated that it found “the 
motions meritless.”  App. 3.  The District Court, having the 
benefit of fully briefed summary judgment motions and a 
voluminous record, further explained that the factual issues 
identified in Defendants’ sanctions motions would be best 
resolved at summary judgment or trial.   
 
 In doing so, the District Court did more than what Rule 
11 requires.  Rule 11(c)(6) requires only that a district court 
explain the basis of its order when the court imposes a 
sanction, not when it denies sanctions.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
11(c)(6) (“An order imposing a sanction must describe the 
sanctioned conduct and explain the basis for the sanction.”).  
While we welcome explanations for all rulings, the District 
Court did more than it needed to do when concluding that 
Defendants’ motions were “meritless.”   
 
 Our review of the record leads us to the same 
conclusion.  Some discrepancies exist between the complaints 
and Plaintiffs’ submissions in opposition to Getz’s summary 
judgment motion, on the one hand, and facts elicited through 
discovery, on the other, but Plaintiffs’ pleadings have a 
factual basis and are not “patently unmeritorious or 
frivolous.”  See Ario, 618 F.3d at 297 (citation omitted).7  
                                                                                                                                               
attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is 
responsible for the violation.”  Id. 11(c)(1). 
7 We have explained that the standard under Rule 11 is 
“stringent” because sanctions “1) are in derogation of the 
general American policy of encouraging resort to the courts 
for peaceful resolution of disputes, 2) tend to spawn satellite 
10 
Although some of the factual allegations may have been 
exaggerated, the record includes evidence that provided a 
reasonable basis for the representations in the complaints and 
summary judgment submissions concerning Getz’s allegedly 
aggressive and discriminatory behavior.  See, e.g., App. 
1027-35.8  The District Court’s conclusion that Defendants’ 
                                                                                                                                               
litigation counter-productive to efficient disposition of cases, 
and 3) increase tensions among the litigating bar and between 
[the] bench and [the] bar.”  Doering v. Union Cty. Bd. of 
Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
8 In addition, many of the alleged falsehoods 
Defendants rely upon are immaterial.  For example, whether 
C.M.’s toes were touching the ground or not, there was 
evidence to support the allegation that C.M. was lifted up.  
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, Advisory Committee’s Note to 1993 
Amendment (stating that “Rule 11 motions should not be 
made or threatened for minor, inconsequential violations of 
the standards prescribed by subdivision (b)”). 
Other alleged misrepresentations occurred during 
depositions, in response to interrogatories, and to and about 
health care providers, or involved counsel’s act of changing 
the e-mail into a document that resembles a letter.  These 
incidents are not sanctionable under Rule 11 because they 
arose in the context of discovery and thus are not within the 
scope of Rule 11.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(d) (stating that Rule 11 
“does not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, 
responses, objections, and motions under Rules 26 through 
37”); see also Landon v. Hunt, 938 F.2d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 
1991) (“We have consistently held that Rule 11 sanctions are 
11 
accusations were meritless was therefore not “contrary to 
reason or without a reasonable basis in law and fact.”  See 
Ario, 618 F.3d at 287 (citation omitted).9  Thus, the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendants’ 
Rule 11 motions.  
 
III 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
                                                                                                                                               
proper only in situations involving a signed pleading.” 
(citation and emphasis omitted)). 
 
9 The District Court also did not err in noting that 
Defendants’ Rule 11 motions were, essentially, a waste of 
judicial resources, and that counsel in this case “ha[d] 
clogged the docket with numerous motions for sanctions, 
motions for discovery and even a motion to disqualify 
counsel.”  App. 4.  While the focus of Rule 11 is on whether a 
claim is wholly without merit, and is not dictated by whether 
resources will be expended in deciding the motion, Rule 11 
motions should conserve rather than misuse judicial 
resources.  See Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 
90, 99 (3d Cir. 1988) (“Rather than misusing scarce 
resources, [the] timely filing and disposition of Rule 11 
motions should conserve judicial energies.”).  Thus, the 
District Court appropriately noted the history of counsels’ 
conduct in this case and the importance of deciding the merits 
of the dispute, rather than ancillary issues. 
